At the opening of the third millennium there appears to be positive global consensus regarding religious liberty as a fundamental human right. In fact, it has become, generally speaking, politically incorrect to be “against” religious liberty. Almost every country claims that it is in favor of religious liberty. There are no more atheistic Albanias, where all religion is prohibited.
This globality of religious liberty begins with Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the same year the World Council of Churches was organized, it voted a statement regarding religious liberty as a basic human right and a necessary corollary of proper ecumenical relations. Indeed, there can be no authentic unity without true religious freedom.
In 1965 the global Roman Catholic Church at its Second Vatican Council made an astonishing policy turnabout by no longer denying free exercise of religion for those “in error,” but affirming the right of every person not to be restricted or interfered with in the practice of religion, subject to the rights of others.
Then in the sixties and seventies the United Nation voted, and scores of nations ratified, the conventions dealing with civil, political, economic, and social rights, including religious liberty.
Beginning in 1975 there has been the so-called Helsinki Process, in which religious liberty is recognized as part of international law, nations having the right to look into the religious liberty and human rights situation of other nations. This is seen as necessary to promote peace and security in Europe.
Most significant to this globalization of religious liberty is the United Nations 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. No nation voted against this consensus Declaration, which includes a statement unique in international documents that every person has the right to observe days of rest in accordance with the precepts of his or her religion.
The collapse of totalitarian Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late eighties was another development with a favorable global ripple effect on religious liberty, not only in Europe, but in Asia and Africa.
All this globalization has produced a theoretical consensus that religious liberty is a fundamental human right based on the dignity of the human person. This dignity requires equality and nondiscrimination in the exercise of the civil right of religious liberty. However, this right is not absolute. Though the right to religious belief is absolute and there must be no religious thought inquisition by authorities, the practice of religion does have some legal limitations. While there are variations from country to country, the best worldwide consensus is that religious liberty restrictions must be based on the nondiscriminatory compelling interest of the necessary rights of others, involving public order, health, and nonsectarian morality.
Of course, globalization can have a negative impact on religious liberty. A first example is the worldwide phenomenon of religious fundamentalism and extremism, which has been spreading like a cancer in most major religions.
An anticult (in Europe called “antisect”) movement has manifested itself in various countries, stirring up public opinion, and therefore certain politicians, regarding the dangers represented by religious minorities, especially unpopular minor religious movements. The anticult movement in one country feeds upon unproven accusations and allegations in other countries. Lists of dangerous religious groups are prepared “star chamber” style by government authorities, without proper investigation and evidence or opportunity given those listed to explain or defend themselves.
Secularism can have worldwide negative religious liberty consequences. There is a secularism (or “laicity,” as it is called in France) that stands not for a benign or neutral separation of church and state but for an antichurch separation. The intention is to squeeze religion out of the fabric of society by first taking on religious minorities and then, when the time is right, major religious bodies and finally religion as a whole.
Antiproselytism too received a global dimension in the nineties. For a quarter of a century the institutionalized ecumenical movement has, if anything, been opposed to proselytism, that is converting baptized members (whether really active and practicing or not) of one church to another. The opening up of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to evangelism (both local and from the West and even from Korea) after the fall of the Communist regimes has placed the issue of proselytism squarely on the religiopolitical agendas. The centuries-old Orthodox churches feel that certain countries are part of their traditional canonical territories and their hierarchies give the impression that they would like to simply go back to the “status quo ante-Communism,” when they were in control of religious life, and religious minorities were subject to restrictions and persecutions.
Two further aspects of the globalization of antiproselytism are the efforts by “Muslim countries” (most visibly Saudi Arabia) to stop any and all forms of Christian evangelism in these nations, and the growing Hindu opposition, sometimes with violence, to what Hindu militants call “Christian proselytism.”
When dealing with proselytism, we are faced with two obvious issues, among others: (1) the recognized religious liberty right to manifest and teach one’s religion and to persuade others of its rightness, and (2) the right of an individual not to be coerced or unduly influenced, because of poverty or other vulnerability, to change religion.
These two rights can on occasion find themselves in conflict. In order to deal with this issue, a group of experts met in Spain in 1999 and early 2000 under the auspices of the International Religious Liberty Association in cooperation with Spain’s Ministry of Justice. This board of experts hammered out a concise and balanced declaration outlining principles of proper dissemination of religious beliefs endeavoring to balance and bring into juxtaposition the above two rights.
In the pastoral letter Dies Domini the pope of Rome gave an increased worldwide dimension to the Sunday issue by reminding his absent flock that he expects them everywhere to be in church attending Mass on Sunday. Furthermore, he urged Catholics “to ensure that civil legislation respects their duty” to observe Sunday. This can, of course, be a delicate issue, for Sunday laws almost inevitably involve religious legislation with inherent church-state separation and religious liberty problems when the state tries to “guarantee” the “right” to “Sunday rest.”
Obviously the pope has a global weekly day of rest in mind. But how can governments respect or guarantee such a right, keeping in mind that, for example, Seventh-day Adventists and some other Christian churches, Jews, and Muslims observe a day other than Sunday for rest or communal worship? Presently there are indications that the Vatican supports the concept that protection of a day of rest as a right applies not only to Sundaykeepers but to those who observe another day.
The whole reality of globalization is enhanced by the fact that there are today two global superpowers (1) the United States of America, arguably the only remaining political superpower, and (2) the Holy See/Papacy/Roman Catholic Church, the most powerful and influential religious entity with worldwide geopolitical dimensions.
At the present time both these superpowers affirm their support of religious liberty. In 1998 the United States passed the International Religious Freedom Act. And the pope has time and again asserted his abiding support of worldwide religious freedom, including specifically the rights of religious minorities. This is vital, because every religion is not only a minority somewhere but is, globally speaking, a worldwide minority!
In view of globalization, should the two superpowers change tack in their support of religious liberty, because of a change in the winds of political correctness, we would be faced with a new and seriously different global religious freedom situation.
At the opening of the third millennium there appears to be positive global consensus regarding religious liberty as a fundamental human right. In fact, it has become, generally speaking, politically incorrect to be “against” religious liberty. Almost every country claims that it is in favor of religious liberty. There are no more atheistic Albanias, where all religion is prohibited.
This globality of religious liberty begins with Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the same year the World Council of Churches was organized, it voted a statement regarding religious liberty as a basic human right and a necessary corollary of proper ecumenical relations. Indeed, there can be no authentic unity without true religious freedom.
In 1965 the global Roman Catholic Church at its Second Vatican Council made an astonishing policy turnabout by no longer denying free exercise of religion for those “in error,” but affirming the right of every person not to be restricted or interfered with in the practice of religion, subject to the rights of others.
Then in the sixties and seventies the United Nation voted, and scores of nations ratified, the conventions dealing with civil, political, economic, and social rights, including religious liberty.
Beginning in 1975 there has been the so-called Helsinki Process, in which religious liberty is recognized as part of international law, nations having the right to look into the religious liberty and human rights situation of other nations. This is seen as necessary to promote peace and security in Europe.
Most significant to this globalization of religious liberty is the United Nations 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. No nation voted against this consensus Declaration, which includes a statement unique in international documents that every person has the right to observe days of rest in accordance with the precepts of his or her religion.
The collapse of totalitarian Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late eighties was another development with a favorable global ripple effect on religious liberty, not only in Europe, but in Asia and Africa.
All this globalization has produced a theoretical consensus that religious liberty is a fundamental human right based on the dignity of the human person. This dignity requires equality and nondiscrimination in the exercise of the civil right of religious liberty. However, this right is not absolute. Though the right to religious belief is absolute and there must be no religious thought inquisition by authorities, the practice of religion does have some legal limitations. While there are variations from country to country, the best worldwide consensus is that religious liberty restrictions must be based on the nondiscriminatory compelling interest of the necessary rights of others, involving public order, health, and nonsectarian morality.
Of course, globalization can have a negative impact on religious liberty. A first example is the worldwide phenomenon of religious fundamentalism and extremism, which has been spreading like a cancer in most major religions.
An anticult (in Europe called “antisect”) movement has manifested itself in various countries, stirring up public opinion, and therefore certain politicians, regarding the dangers represented by religious minorities, especially unpopular minor religious movements. The anticult movement in one country feeds upon unproven accusations and allegations in other countries. Lists of dangerous religious groups are prepared “star chamber” style by government authorities, without proper investigation and evidence or opportunity given those listed to explain or defend themselves.
Secularism can have worldwide negative religious liberty consequences. There is a secularism (or “laicity,” as it is called in France) that stands not for a benign or neutral separation of church and state but for an antichurch separation. The intention is to squeeze religion out of the fabric of society by first taking on religious minorities and then, when the time is right, major religious bodies and finally religion as a whole.
Antiproselytism too received a global dimension in the nineties. For a quarter of a century the institutionalized ecumenical movement has, if anything, been opposed to proselytism, that is converting baptized members (whether really active and practicing or not) of one church to another. The opening up of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to evangelism (both local and from the West and even from Korea) after the fall of the Communist regimes has placed the issue of proselytism squarely on the religiopolitical agendas. The centuries-old Orthodox churches feel that certain countries are part of their traditional canonical territories and their hierarchies give the impression that they would like to simply go back to the “status quo ante-Communism,” when they were in control of religious life, and religious minorities were subject to restrictions and persecutions.
Two further aspects of the globalization of antiproselytism are the efforts by “Muslim countries” (most visibly Saudi Arabia) to stop any and all forms of Christian evangelism in these nations, and the growing Hindu opposition, sometimes with violence, to what Hindu militants call “Christian proselytism.”
When dealing with proselytism, we are faced with two obvious issues, among others: (1) the recognized religious liberty right to manifest and teach one’s religion and to persuade others of its rightness, and (2) the right of an individual not to be coerced or unduly influenced, because of poverty or other vulnerability, to change religion.
These two rights can on occasion find themselves in conflict. In order to deal with this issue, a group of experts met in Spain in 1999 and early 2000 under the auspices of the International Religious Liberty Association in cooperation with Spain’s Ministry of Justice. This board of experts hammered out a concise and balanced declaration outlining principles of proper dissemination of religious beliefs endeavoring to balance and bring into juxtaposition the above two rights.
In the pastoral letter Dies Domini the pope of Rome gave an increased worldwide dimension to the Sunday issue by reminding his absent flock that he expects them everywhere to be in church attending Mass on Sunday. Furthermore, he urged Catholics “to ensure that civil legislation respects their duty” to observe Sunday. This can, of course, be a delicate issue, for Sunday laws almost inevitably involve religious legislation with inherent church-state separation and religious liberty problems when the state tries to “guarantee” the “right” to “Sunday rest.”
Obviously the pope has a global weekly day of rest in mind. But how can governments respect or guarantee such a right, keeping in mind that, for example, Seventh-day Adventists and some other Christian churches, Jews, and Muslims observe a day other than Sunday for rest or communal worship? Presently there are indications that the Vatican supports the concept that protection of a day of rest as a right applies not only to Sundaykeepers but to those who observe another day.
The whole reality of globalization is enhanced by the fact that there are today two global superpowers (1) the United States of America, arguably the only remaining political superpower, and (2) the Holy See/Papacy/Roman Catholic Church, the most powerful and influential religious entity with worldwide geopolitical dimensions.
At the present time both these superpowers affirm their support of religious liberty. In 1998 the United States passed the International Religious Freedom Act. And the pope has time and again asserted his abiding support of worldwide religious freedom, including specifically the rights of religious minorities. This is vital, because every religion is not only a minority somewhere but is, globally speaking, a worldwide minority!
In view of globalization, should the two superpowers change tack in their support of religious liberty, because of a change in the winds of political correctness, we would be faced with a new and seriously different global religious freedom situation.
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